D, 1:67. SUFEE, CD. SEE AND 11

4 6 6 2

DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE DESCRIPTION OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESTATOR

The Secretary

(NCK-TO-HI)

FRCM : DIR - Roger Hilsman (

STRIDENT SOVIET STATEMENT ON PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S SPEECE

INTELLIGENCE NOTE: EVASIVE RECARDING COUNTERWOVES

Missile Deployment Not Admitted. The Soviet Government statement this The second section of the second seco morning did not explicitly acmit the fact of Soviet missile deployment in Cuba. and the second control of the second of

were the second of the second the statement says that Soviet military aid to Cuba was intended to increase that country's defense potential, thus obscuring the fact that offensive weapons are involved. Moscow's closest approach to a direct conission of the facts was the claim that all of the Soviet Union's armaments scree the purpose of defense.

Cuban Role Stressed. Moscow emphasized the Cuban role in the crisis throughout its statement. Thus by pooh-poohing the Cuban threat to the US, by indicating that Cuba naturally could not agree to the US demand for the withdrawal of Soviet weapons, by reaffirming Cuban willingness to negotiate all ortstanding differences with the US, Moscow appeared to be avoiding as much as possible a direct confrontation with the US.

the state of the state of Coscure Threats. While warning that the US was playing with fire, Moscow avoided committing itself to specific courses of action which might involve oran ang ang ang ang an ang ang ang ang an and an analong an the use of force. The Soviet government stated that nuclear veapons would not fall on US territory unless aggression is committed. While Moscow did not conficitly eachew first use of muclear vergons in response to a US attack upon Cubs, the statement appears to have been carefully drafted to avoid making completely explicit my Soviet comitment to general war other than in the case

CC: 5, L, MG, S/AL G/PM, M. S/P, AF, ARA, EUR, FE, KEAE, AID, NOES), 10, P. W. L, USIA, BOB, CIA DOD, JCS, SOLDY). NOW AL, AID, NOES), 10, P. W. L, USIA, BOB, CIA

200, Jes, 3(2671), Olm. Oc.

of a direct attack upon the Soviet Union. Moscow made no statement about whether or not it would attempt to run the blockade.

Security Council Meeting. The operative paragraph of the statement calls for an immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider the question of the "violation of the UN Charter and threat to the peace on the part of the United States."

Military Proper ations. Meanwhile, Moscow has announced a series of military preparations: Defense Minister Malinovsky reported to the Soviet government on measures to improve the battle readiness of Soviet forces, discharges of servicemen were halted and all leaves cancelled, Marshal Greeklo called a meeting of representatives Warsaw Pact armies.

implications. By confining its action to a call for a UN Security Council Leating Moscov apparently hopes to mobilize world opinion to force the US to abandon its blockade. Soviet military measures will serve the same purpose by contributing to a heightened war scare. Moscow may well assect incidents in Cuban vaters or Soviet retaliations elsewhere to add to the atmosphere of tension. At the same time these military preparations serve to brace the USSR for any military eventuality. However, the Soviet reaction thus far suggests a high degree of circumspection and implies that the Soviet Union may be carefully leaving the back door open for a retreat from the danger of general war over Cuba.